School nance equalization has probably affected American schools more than any other reform of the last 30 years. Understanding it is a prerequisite for making optimal social investments in human capital. Yet, it is poorly understood. In this paper I explain why: it differs from conventional redistribution because it is based on property values, which are endogenous to schools' productivity, taste for education, and the school nance system itself. I characterize equalization schemes and show why some "level down" and others "level up." Schemes that strongly level down have unintended consequences: even poor districts can end up worse off. I also show how school nance equalization affects property prices, private school attendance, and student achievement.
I. INTRODUCTION
School nance equalization (SFE) is probably the reform that has most affected American schools over the past 30 years. Unlike reforms such as school choice or merit pay, which are often debated but tiny in practice, SFE has affected every school in the nation-some of them dramatically. In some states, its effects on school spending, private schooling, and achievement have been felt for decades. SFE is, moreover, of great interest to economists because optimal social investment in human capital (on which economic growth depends) hinges on how school spending is distributed across students. 1 In short, SFE is an interesting and important policy that we should understand. Yet it is poorly understood in practice. This is not to say that, when state courts and legislatures decide to equalize spending across school districts, they are confused about their goals or the legal issues. States are confused about how to implement their goals. This has not kept them from enacting SFE schemes, the key feature of which is redistribution from districts with high per-pupil property values to districts with low per-pupil property values. Since 1970, every American state has enacted at least one such scheme. 2 States frequently rely on lawyers rather than economists, so that the schemes are manifestations of the legal rhetoric of equalization rather than economic logic about taxation and redistribution. In practice, schemes often have effects that are smaller or different than what was intended. As a result, equalization debates and court cases recur, and states seem to have abandoned trying to understand school nance in favor of trial-and-error methods of nding suitable schemes. This is a pity because there are a few general principles that could help states understand equalization. Also, empirical evidence-which states often dismiss because it seems inconsistent and irrelevant to their implementation decisions-can be made useful if school nance schemes are characterized by a few variables that summarize the income and price effects. In this paper I attempt to establish general principles about SFE and provide useful empirical evidence. SFE schemes have frequently replaced categorical aid schemes, which redistribute from high income households to districts that contain students who are poor or expensive to educate. Categorical aid is a conventional form of scal federalism and is therefore reasonably well understood by economists. SFE schemes have an unconventional feature that makes them much less understood: the basis of redistribution (property values) is endogenous to schools' productivity, local preferences for education, and the school nance system itself.
Because states do not fully appreciate conventional scal federalism and even more because they do not appreciate the consequences of basing redistribution on endogenous property values, SFE schemes sometimes produce unintended consequences. In particular, they can shrink the "pie" of total spending on schools even as they divide it more evenly. This phenomenon is known as leveling-down: greater spending equality accompanied by lower average spending. If leveling-down is suf ciently extreme, per-pupil spending can actually fall in districts that were intended bene ciaries of equalization.
The best known SFE is California's, which was a response to the second Serrano decision in 1976. It owes its fame to its stringency (it prohibited differences of more than 200 dollars in regular per-pupil spending) and to the unprecedented fall in spending that followed it. 3 Some commentators have argued that the fall in spending was not leveling-down and was unrelated to the SFE. This argument has gained support from the experience of other states, where SFE has not been associated with leveling-down.
In this paper I rst attempt to explain how SFE works and then provide evidence on its effects. The main results of the rst section are that (a) school nance schemes need not be mysterious black boxes-they can be characterized by a few variables that summarize their income and price effects, and (b) SFE schemes always level down compared with categorical aid schemes that are intended to achieve the same amount of redistribution. The latter result is just one of several peculiar consequences of having a scheme for redistribution among jurisdictions that is based on assets whose prices depend on how people value the jurisdictions. The major result of the second section is that, if one uses the few key variables, one can reconcile apparently con icting evidence on the effects of SFE. Moreover, the variables (such as the foundation property tax rate and the tax price of marginal local spending) appear in school nance formulas, so a state can design a formula that best meets its objectives. 4 Speci cally, I calculate the values of the school nance variables for every district in the United States in 1970 States in , 1980 States in , and 1990 -thereby bringing all of the schemes into a common framework. I use regression analysis to estimate the effect of SFE on several outcomes: the level of per-pupil spending, inequality in per-pupil spending, property values, private school attendance, and student achievement. (In the last case, I estimate an education production function, using the high school drop-out rate as the measure of student achievement and SFE as a shock to districts' spending.) I account for the endogeneity of the observed values of the school nance variables by simulating the values each district would face if it were to have remained at its pre-SFE tax rates, spending, and property values.
The results suggest that some spending equality can be achieved with leveling-up or mild leveling-down, but that near equality of per-pupil spending cannot be achieved without extremely strong incentives. In theory, either leveling-down or leveling-up SFEs could include extremely strong incentives, but, in practice, extremely strong incentives are included only in leveling-down SFEs because it is cheap to forbid high spending but expensive to bribe districts to spend more than they prefer to. Strikingly, there are actually poor districts in the United States that would probably have higher spending if their state attempted to achieve less complete equality.
My method differs from that of other researchers [Downes and Shah 1994; Manwaring and Sheffrin 1997; Card and Payne 1998; Evans, Murray, and Schwab 1999] , who simply create a dummy variable for SFEs, lumping together schemes that changed school nance variables in different directions. My approach has some advantages: it produces economically interpretable estimates that are directly relevant for policy. In contrast, the dummy variable methodology produces estimates that are dif cult to interpret, that do not illuminate the underlying economics, and that cannot provide policy-makers with useful information for designing SFEs. Put another way, my method is more likely to satisfy both economists, who want to understand the economics of equalization, and policy-makers, who know that they need to do some equalizing but want to understand the trade-offs they face. In addition, results produced by the dummy variable methodology are sensitive to the years and states investigated because it lumps heterogeneous policies together into a single treatment. For evidence on this point, see Hoxby [1999] .
II. SCHOOL FINANCE SCHEMES
In this section I describe prototypical school nance schemes. The prototypes illustrate general properties, but one must remember that every state's school nance program is different and that the prototypes are extremely simple compared with actual formulas.
A. Pure Local Property Tax Finance
Although no state's schools are currently nanced through pure local property tax nance, it remains the core of most states' systems. Under it, districts spend all of their local property tax 1192 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS revenue (and only their local property tax revenue), and households divide their disposable income between property taxes, housing consumption, and other consumption. That is, a household's annual budget constraint is (1) y ij 5 c ij 1~1 1 t j ! p j h h ij , and a district's annual, per-pupil budget constraint is
where i indexes households in a district, j indexes districts, h i j are the housing services consumed by household i in district j, p j h is the annualized price of a unit of housing services in district j, c i j is household i's other consumption, e j is spending per-pupil in district j, v j is annualized property value per pupil in district j, t j is the tax rate on annualized property value in district j, and s j is the number of students (households) in district j. The variable y i j is the income of household i that lives in district j, net of taxes that are unrelated to school nance. Purely for simplicity, each household is assumed to have one student. This assumption makes it easy to write equations in per-pupil terms. Note that all nancial variables, including property values and the tax rate, are annualized. 5
B. Categorical Aid
Before SFE schemes became popular in the early 1970s, categorical aid was the most common method of redistributing among school districts. Categorical aid is still used by most states for limited purposes, but has been almost entirely displaced by SFE for major redistribution.
Categorical aid has two features that distinguish it from SFE. It is funded by state income or sales taxes-in fact, almost 5. A common method of annualizing property values is to multiply them by the current interest rate. The tax rate on annual property values would then be the statutory tax rate divided by the current interest rate. One should relax the assumption that each household has a single child if one is exploring the relationship between school nance and the household age distribution. Relaxing it would not prove particularly useful here. For now, it is best to ignore differences in assessed and market values. Treat v i as though it were annualized market value, and treat t i as though it were the tax rate on annualized market value. Assessment is discussed in the section on data.
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any state-level taxes except property taxes. 6 Second, categorical aid grants are based not on property values but on one or more characteristics of a school district, such as mean household income, the poverty rate, or the share of children from single-parent households. The logic of categorical aid is to give revenue to a school district if its residents are liquidity constrained or its children are unusually expensive to educate.
In the remainder of the paper, I sometimes discuss categorical aid schemes as though income were the only characteristic on which grants and taxes were based. I do this simply for convenience, although income is certainly most important in practice.
Under at grant categorical aid, households' disposable income is reduced by a school-related tax on income. Each district receives a per-pupil grant that is a function of the income and demographics (X) of households. The appropriate household and per-pupil district annual budget constraints are
where t F G C A is the school-related tax rate on income, FGCA¼ is the at grant, and X is a vector of demographics variables.
Matching grant categorical aid schemes match locally raised spending, where the matching rate is a function of district demographics. Typically, the lower is household income, the higher is the matching rate. In addition, matching grant categorical aid schemes often include at grants. The household and per-pupil district annual budget constraints are
where mrca¼ is the matching rate and t M G C A is the schoolrelated tax on income that funds the matching and at grants.
C. Foundation Aid
Foundation Aid (FA) is the most common type of SFE scheme. FA is like at grant categorical aid except that it redis-6. Income and sales taxes are not attached to particular school districts. The property tax is based on assets that are attached to particular school districts. This is the key distinction.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS tributes among districts based on per-pupil property values, not on sociodemographic characteristics of households. Under a very simple FA scheme, the household annual budget constraint is given by equation (1), and the per-pupil district annual budget constraint is
where f is the foundation level of spending guaranteed to each district, and t f is the statewide foundation tax rate on property that supports the scheme. FA is often designed to be self-funding, so that total foundation taxes paid equal total foundation grants disbursed. That is, t f is often set so that
where J is the total number of districts.
The stringency of a FA program is greater in states where the foundation grant is higher relative to per-pupil spending. If the foundation grant is set at, say, the seventy-fth percentile of per-pupil spending in the state, then only a minority of districts want to set their local property tax rate higher than the FA property tax rate (in order to spend more than the foundation level). It is possible to set t f and f so high that no district would want to spend more than the foundation level.
D. Power Equalization/Guaranteed Tax Revenue Schemes
Most states that attempt stringent equalization do so through guaranteed tax revenue (GTR) schemes or power equalization schemes. These two types of schemes are fundamentally similar, so hereafter I refer to them as GTR schemes.
GTR schemes attempt to make the same tax rate t generate the same revenue for each school district in the state, regardless of the district's own property value per pupil. Many GTR schemes provide stronger redistribution among districts that have higher tax rates. For instance, the scheme might guarantee average per-pupil revenue in the state (this would be the rst guarantee, or g 1 ) for the rst t g 1 mils of districts' property tax rates, guarantee per-pupil revenue at the sixty-fth percentile in the state (this would be the second guarantee, or g 2 ) for the next t g 2 mils of districts' property tax rates, and guarantee per-pupil revenue at the eighty-fth percentile in the state (this would be the third 1195 SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATIONS guarantee, or g 3 ) for any remaining mils of the property tax rate. (Property taxes are typically expressed in mils or thousandths.) Thus, in order to get the maximum amount of aid, a district must have both low per-pupil valuation and high property tax rates. Under a very simple GTR scheme with two guarantees, the household annual budget constraints are given by equation (1), and the per-pupil district annual budget constraint is
GTR schemes are sometimes self-funding, so that tax rates and guarantees are chosen to ensure that contributions from districts with high property value per pupil fully fund the aid to districts with low property value per pupil. For instance, if the above system were self-funding, the following equation would hold:
To prevent districts from opting out of GTR schemes (by providing negligible local public schools), states often impose a minimum local tax rate.
California has an extreme GTR scheme, under which each district gets the basic guarantee regardless of its local tax revenue and tax rate. 7 Because every district has an incentive to set its local property tax rate to zero and free ride on the tax revenues collected by other districts, the scheme includes a minimum tax rate (10 mils). When the scheme was enacted, Californians discovered that their local schools did not get any additional revenue if they let themselves be taxed at more than the minimum rate or if their property values rose. Thus, it is not surprising that, soon after, the majority of Californian voters supported Proposition 13, which made 10 mils the maximum tax rate as well as the minimum tax rate and banned reassessment of a house's value as long 7. Actually, California's scheme is not strictly self-funding, and a few districts are exempted from the system because of a hold harmless clause.
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If California's scheme illustrates one extreme, New Jersey's recent GTR scheme illustrates another. A simpli ed version of it is as follows:
The parameter v g was set at the eighty-fth percentile of perpupil valuation in the state, and f N J was set equal to mean spending in the state. Districts with per-pupil valuation that was at least 90 percent of v g spent their locally raised revenue (t j v j ) plus 0.10 z f N J . But a district with, say, per-pupil valuation equal to half of v g spent one and a half times its locally raised revenue, up to a maximum of t i v i 1 0.5 z f N J . Since every district received at least some aid under the New Jersey formula, the scheme was not self-funding. It required revenues from statewide income and sales taxes. A district's tax price is the amount of revenue it has to raise in order to spend an extra dollar. GTR schemes make each district's tax price a positive function of its per-pupil valuation. One can derive a district's tax price by differentiating its budget constraint with respect to its local tax rate. The GTR scheme given by equation (9), for instance, produces the following tax prices:
The tax prices actually produced by states' GTR formulas vary greatly. California's tax prices are nearly in nite, and New Jersey's are mostly less than one. 8 8. In California the only way that a district can increase its local expenditure by raising more revenue is through the self-funding constraint. The typical district in California would see less than a 0.001 dollar increase in its per-pupil expenditure if it raised an extra dollar of revenue per pupil. Under the New Jersey formula, a district with per-pupil valuation above 90 percent of the eighty-fth percentile in the state faced a tax price equal to one. A district with per-pupil valuation below this cutoff (and suf ciently low per-pupil spending) had a tax price given by
Thus, a district with per-pupil valuation equal to 0.2 of per-pupil valuation at the eighty-fth percentile faced a tax price of 0.56.
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III. SCHOOL SPENDING UNDER VARIOUS SCHOOL FINANCE SCHEMES
In order to predict the effects of various school nance schemes, we need to combine the formulas from the previous section with Tiebout determination of school spending. In the Tiebout [1956] model, households maximize their utility by choosing among residences located in different districts and by voting on tax rates in the districts where they reside.
A. Tiebout Equilibria with Local Property Tax Finance
The Tiebout literature has focused on pure local property tax nance. This paper is not the place for a review of the literature, but it is useful to rehearse two properties of Tiebout equilibria. 9 First, households tend to live in districts with other households that prefer similar school spending. 10 Second, spending tends to be such that the bene ts to local households of a marginal dollar of school spending are equal to the costs to local households.
B. Tiebout Equilibrium with Categorical Aid
The only thing that makes categorical aid different than more familiar forms of scal federalism (such as federal highway aid to states) is that households can react to the aid by changing their preferred district.
Before considering such reactions, consider the rst-order effects of categorical aid. Under at grant categorical aid, a district receives a net revenue transfer that has income effects (local residents feel richer or poorer and want to buy more or fewer school inputs). There are, however, no price incentives for residents or school staff to change their behavior. That is, under at grant categorical aid, a household pays an additional dollar in taxes to have its local schools spend an additional dollar.
Under matching grant categorical aid, the tax price that a district's residents face is a positive function of their income. Tax prices have income effects, and they also have substitution effects: richer residents have a price incentive to substitute away 9. Epple and Platt [1998] provide a good, formal exposition of Tiebout equilibrium with local property tax nance, median voter determination of local tax rates, and heterogeneous tastes.
10. This does not mean that districts contain households with homogeneous income. A district might contain high income households that have a moderate taste for education and moderate income households that have a high taste for education if both types of households prefer the same level of local school spending.
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Households' preferred districts can change when categorical aid is introduced. For instance, high income households have less incentive to segregate themselves. Essentially, low income neighbors are accompanied by categorical aid, which partially eliminates the difference in preferred school spending that would otherwise deter low and high income households from living in the same district.
Theory cannot predict whether categorical aid levels up or down compared with local property tax nance. The direction of change depends on how preferences for education differ between high and low income households. If high and low income households have identical preferences and there are decreasing marginal bene ts of school spending, then even at grant categorical aid levels up because it takes from households that want to spend a small share of their marginal income on education and gives to households that want to spend a large share of their marginal income on education. On the other hand, if high income households have much greater taste for education than low income households, even matching grant categorical aid schemes can level down. The possibility exists because, even if low income households face subsidized prices for education spending, they can still choose to spend less on education than high income households would have spent. A formal exposition of Tiebout equilibria with categorical aid is presented by Fernandez and Rogerson [1999] , who show that a range of possibilities exists. 11 Furthermore, there is a well-known empirical phenomenon, known as the " ypaper effect," that suggests that districts spend a larger amount out of income from grants than one would predict based on their elasticities of spending with respect to (normal) income. There are also studies that suggest that districts overreact to being penalized for their spending. 12 In short, even a calibration based on normal income elasticities is unlikely to tell us whether categorical aid levels up or down. 11. The paper is confusing because they claim to analyze SFE schemes, but they actually analyze categorical aid schemes. Moreover, they make local income taxes support public schools. Local public schools are not supported by local income taxes anywhere in the United States, and households' location and voting decisions would not be similar under local income and local property taxes (see Nechyba [1997a] ).
12. Hines and Thaler [1995] survey the ypaper effect literature.
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C. Tiebout Equilibria with School Finance Equalization-Part 1
Here, I go beyond the existing literature to consider Tiebout equilibria with SFE. In order to do this, it is necessary to review a few more results from the Tiebout literature.
First, productivity differences between school districts are capitalized in house prices. If a district uses its money more ef ciently than neighboring districts, households will be willing to pay more for houses in the district because the tax burden will be smaller for any given level of school quality.
Second, districts that have assets that convey positive scal externalities tend to attract households with high taste for education, so that entire districts can be lled with residents who have a high taste for education relative to their incomes and whose house prices contain a relatively large amount of capitalization. Consider a district that contains vacation property. Vacation property tends to convey positive scal externalities because its owners pay property taxes out of proportion to their consumption of local services. (The location of desirable vacation property is also relatively inelastic.) Nonvacationer households should be willing to pay more for a house in the district because their tax burden is small for any given level of local spending. This is capitalization. More importantly, the district attracts households whose taste for education is high relative to their incomes because the absolute size of the scal externality is increasing in the tax rate. As a result, districts that contain households whose taste for education is high systemically have capitalization forming a large share of house prices. 13 So far, I have been describing the asset that conveys the scal externality as tangible property, but the asset could be something intangible, like a district's good reputation with colleges and employers, a district's spending each tax dollar more productively, or some feature (a college, cultural institution, employer, et cetera) that makes the district attractive to families whose children are good peers. Anything that affects how a dollar of tax revenue in a district translates into perceived output can be capitalized. Put another way, there is some part of a house's price that can be explained purely by the house's physical characteristics, the physical characteristics of the land attached to it, and its local property tax rate; the remaining part of a house's price is 13. Households are heterogeneous in both income and tastes: this is a statement about taste for education, for any given level of income.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS sensitive to its association with a particular district and that district's productivity, reputation, scal externalities, attractiveness to peers, et cetera. Both statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence from real estate professionals suggest that the latter part of the price can be substantial in districts with good tangible and intangible assets. 14 Of course, it is not easy to observe the division of each property price into the part that is payment for housing and land services and the part that re ects the district's tangible and intangible assets. Nevertheless, the variable v i means different things in different districts. As a reminder, it is useful to write v i as the sum v i 5 v* i 1 v* i *, where v* i is the price of housing and land services and v* i * is the part of the price that depends on the association of the land with the particular school district i.
Just as with a scal externality, not only can a district's tangible and intangible assets get capitalized, but districts with such assets attract households whose taste for education is high relative to their incomes. That is, there will be a positive correlation between v* i * and taste for education (for a given income). From now on, I assume that some districts do have tangible or intangible assets, so that v* i * and taste for education are positively correlated. (Of course, if one is hesitant about this assumption and believes that house prices might be fully explained by their physical characteristics, the physical characteristics of attached land, and local property tax rates; then one believes that v** might be zero everywhere. In such a case, there could be no correlation between tastes and v* i *, and one should modify the strong inequalities ("less than") of the next section to be weak inequalities ("less than or equal to").
D. Tiebout Equilibria with School Finance Equalization-Part 2
What makes categorical aid and SFE schemes similar is that they tax districts on some indicator of ability-to-pay. These taxes cause the usual distortions. Income taxes distort income-related decisions like labor supply. Property taxes distort decisions about purchases of housing and land services. What makes SFE 14. Black [1999] provides particularly nice evidence that a house's pricecontrolling for its physical characteristics, land, and tax rate-depends on the school with which it is associated. Vigdor [1999] reviews a variety of other empirical evidence that con rms that households with unusually high demand for school spending relative to their incomes live in districts that have property prices that are unusually high.
1201
SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATIONS schemes peculiar is that they do not just tax indicators of abilityto-pay. They also tax v**.
It is useful to compare FA and categorical aid schemes that have the same at/foundation grant because such a comparison holds the redistributive goals constant. Although theory delivers ambiguous predictions about whether at grant categorical aid levels up or down relative to local property tax nance, theory is unambiguous about the difference between at grant categorical aid and FA.
Which districts could receive more money under FA than they would have received under categorical aid? The answer is districts in which households prefer to spend an unusually small share of their incomes on schools. The reverse is true as well. Thus, average school spending under a FA scheme will be lower than average school spending under categorical aid with the same at grant. Because FA generates income effects that are systemically related to households' tastes, it creates leveling-down compared with categorical aid. Figure I illustrates this point. Consider two districts, A and B, that are of the same size and that contain households with identical income but different tastes for education. School spending is on the horizontal axis, and consumption of nonhousing goods is on the vertical axis. Residents of districts A and B are on the same budget constraint because they have the same income, but residents of district A have less taste for education (the indifference curves for district A are atter than those for district B). Suppose that, under at grant categorical aid, the districts are at points A 0 and B 0 and spend amounts e A 0 and e B 0 . Average education spending is e # 0 (midway between e A 0 and e B 0 ). As discussed above, there is a positive correlation between taste for education and v**, so v* A * , v* B *. A FA formula transfers income from residents of district B to residents of district A. Under FA, the districts face the budget constraints given by the dotted lines spend at points A 1 and B 1 . 15 FA has induced the districts to spend amounts that are more equal (in fact, they happen to spend exactly the same amount in the gure). However, average education spending also falls from e # 0 to e # 1 . Thus, 15. The old budget constraint is midway between the two new budget constraints because the FA scheme has the same at/foundation grant as the categorical aid scheme. That is, the two districts, A and B, are making the same transfers to districts whose residents have incomes different than those of A and B residents.
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It is useful to compare GTR schemes with matching grant categorical aid schemes that attempt to achieve a similar amount of redistribution. In general, if a district receives a larger net transfer from the state and has a lower tax price under a GTR scheme than under a matching grant categorical aid scheme, then it is a district in which households prefer to spend an unusually small share of their incomes on schools. The reverse holds too. Compared with matching grant categorical aid schemes that attempt to achieve a similar degree of redistribution and are similarly self-funding, GTR schemes level down. Figure II illustrates this point. Consider districts A and B again. Under a matching grant categorical aid scheme, residents of districts A and B are at points A 2 and B 2 on the same budget constraint. They spend amounts e A 2 and e B 2 . Average education spending is e # 2 (midway between e A 2 and e B 2 ). As discussed above, v** is positively correlated with taste for education, so a GTR scheme sets a higher tax price for residents FIGURE I School Spending under Categorical Aid and Foundation Aid 1203 SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATIONS of district B than for residents of district A. Under GTR, the districts face budget constraints given by the dotted lines labeled "B.C. A " and "B.C. B ," and are at A 3 and B 3 . They spend amounts e A 3 and e B 3 , and average education spending is e # 3 (midway between e A 3 and e B 3 ). In short, the amounts they spend are more equal, but average spending falls. Relative to a matching grant categorical aid scheme that attempts to achieve the same redistribution, a GTR scheme levels down.
E. Summary
In summary, both categorical aid and SFE can reduce the dispersion of spending (relative to local nance). However, theory does not tell us whether categorical aid and SFE raise or lower mean spending. 16 SFE levels down compared with similar cate-16. To proceed in closed form, one would substitute the SFE budget constraints into a general equilibrium problem à la Epple and Platt [1998] . This procedure would be impossible to carry out because revenue transfers and tax prices depend on preferences. It might be feasible to proceed à la Nechyba [1997b] and simulate the effects of various schemes with computable general equilibrium I have used only four variables to describe the constraints imposed by school nance schemes: (1) the foundation tax rate, (2) the school nance-related income or sales tax rate, (3) the at/foundation grant, and (4) the tax price. Values for these variables can found in each school nance formula (see below). It is worth keeping in mind that, although tax prices can be affected by either GTR or matching grant categorical aid, nearly all actual variation in tax prices is generated by GTR schemes. Also, I invert the tax price before doing empirical analysis. (The inverted tax price is the dollars that a district gets to spend if it raises one dollar in local revenue.) Because some SFE schemes have nearly in nite tax prices, it is easier to work with inverted tax prices.
IV. BEYOND THE DIRECT EFFECTS OF EQUALIZATION ON SPENDING
Thus far, I have focused on the direct effects of SFEs on spending, but SFEs have other consequences.
First, the consequences of an SFE can be capitalized. Because households choose among residences within the state, the price of housing will fall in districts that pay more into the scheme than they get out of it, and vice versa. Since net aid is a negative function of property values, capitalization of an SFE will partially undo it. Put another way, the basis of redistribution is endogenous to the consequences of the redistribution scheme. (The basis of redistribution under categorical aid is not similarly endogenous.) Since house prices are asset prices, one might expect that SFEs would be capitalized as soon their provisions were known. In practice, however, schemes may be capitalized as districts begin to recognize their consequences, over a few budget cycles.
Second, a number of SFE schemes have built-in feedback loops that exaggerate the initial tendency toward leveling up or down. This usually occurs when parameters in the scheme (such as f, g 1 , or g 2 ) are functions of school spending in the state. In the New Jersey formula, for example, f N J was mean per-pupil spending in the state. If low valuation districts spent more under the New Jersey formula and high valuation districts spent about the same amount (a likely consequence of setting tax prices less than or equal to one in every district), the target level of spending rose. As a consequence, there were further reductions in districts' tax prices, which encouraged yet further spending.
Third, as Silva and Sonstelie [1995] point out, an SFE may start out with mean state spending as its target, but the target will drift toward the median level of preferred spending in the state because the median voter is decisive. The distribution of preferred spending is likely to be right-skewed (because the income distribution is right-skewed), so shifting the targets from mean to median preferred spending will generate leveling down. This argument depends on the idea that, in Tiebout equilibrium with local nance, every household has preferences similar to the decisive voter in its district so that the state's mean spending re ects mean preferred spending.
Fourth, households who nd it hard to attain their desired schools after an SFE may shift toward private schooling, either by sending their children to private schools or by creating local educational foundations that effectively privatize parts of local schooling (such as athletics, advanced courses, or building projects). The most privatization should occur in districts that have high preferred spending because SFEs most constrain these districts. Indeed, in California after its SFE, the share of students attending private schools rose about 50 percent [Downes and Schoeman 1998 ], and educational foundations grew tremendously [Brunner and Sonstelie 1996] . Privatization grew disproportionately in districts that were constrained by the SFE formula to spend less than they traditionally had. The abandonment of the public school sector by such districts is important because their voters (as long as they remain public school parents) are core supporters of ambitious state goals in education. 17 Fifth, SFE may affect student achievement through changes in schools' resources and changes in schoolmates. (Schoolmates may change if households respond to an SFE by moving or sending their children to private schools.) Regardless of the channel by which SFE affects achievement, achievement is likely to rise more among students who are otherwise low-performing than among students who are otherwise high-performing. Low-per-17. See Nechyba [1996] , Epple and Romano [1996] , and Glomm and Ravikumar [1998] for theoretical studies of the effect on public school spending of making private school alternatives relatively more attractive.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS forming students disproportionately attend schools that gain money when an SFE is enacted and that become more attractive to parents who have a taste for education. If one wants to discover a positive effect of SFE on achievement, one should focus on measures of achievement that re ect the outcomes of low-performing students.
Finally, even an equalization that initially levels up can level down as it ages if voters respond to the SFE by constraining the state so that future adjustments in the formula cannot further exploit their property wealth. The most obvious such constraints are property tax limitations and targets that are strictly tied to in ation. Eventually, changed circumstances may make voters want to impose more generous constraints, but they may not trust that the state will not exploit the opportunity to readjust the formula.
V. DATA
Estimating the effects of SFEs requires school district data on expenditure, enrollment, property values, property tax rates, and sociodemographic characteristics of the population like income. I also need information about each state's school nance laws. I derive data from several sources.
A. Census of Governments Data
The Census of Governments, which is conducted every ve years, records administrative data on school spending for every district in the United States. I use the 1972, 1982, and 1992 censuses because I need to match the Governments data to Census of Population data, which are available for decennial years. 18
B. Census of Population and Housing Data
For data on enrollment and demographics, I use the Census of Population and Housing, summarized at the school district 18. See United States Department of Commerce [1974, 1984, 1999] . Most school districts are independent jurisdictions and have their own entry in the 1972 and 1982 Census of Governments. School districts that are dependent jurisdictions are included in the entry for the municipality or county on which they depend. Regardless of whether the district is dependent or independent, school spending is recorded as expenditure on local education. In the 1992 Census of Governments, each district has its own entry, regardless of whether it is independent or dependent. 19 For 1970, districts were mapped to Census data in one of two ways. All dependent districts, all countywide independent districts, and any independent district that is aligned with a general purpose jurisdiction (such as a municipality or town) were mapped to Census data through summary les prepared for the Of ce of Revenue Sharing. 20 For the remaining independent school districts, I aggregated block group/enumeration district data up to the district level. 21
C. Consolidated Districts and Special Districts
Districts that consolidate are kept in the sample if the component districts can be successfully identi ed in previous censuses and "preconsolidated." A regular district is dropped only if it cannot be matched from year to year or it is impossible to determine the value of school nance variables for the "preconsolidated" district. I dropped special districts that are not based on geography but instead serve populations of students like the blind. Such special districts are not regulated by states' normal school nance laws.
D. Property Values
In order to calculate taxable property value in each district, I used several sources. Some states report districts' taxable property values in their statistical abstracts. When such published data were available, I used them. 22 
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS owner-occupied housing to the asset value of renter-occupied housing (annual rent divided by the then-prevailing 30-year mortgage rate). Then, I multiplied the residential property tax base by the ratio of total property value to residential property value in the jurisdiction [Taxable Property Values 1972 , 1982 , and 1992 . 23 The estimates obtained by this method had a 0.96 correlation with published data. After matching the data described above, I had 13,281 school districts for each of the three years (a total of 39,843 observations). The usable observations represent 92 percent of all regular districts and 94.8 percent of all students in such districts.
E. Calculation of Tax Rates, Tax Prices, and Grants
I derived basic information on school nance laws from the series Public School Finance Programs. 24 The editions that cover the 1968 -1969, 1970 -1971, 1978 -1979, and 1987-1988 school years were especially helpful, as they closely precede a Census of Governments year. The laws must precede the nance data by long enough to have had an effect. 25 Public School Finance Programs sometimes provides full information on an SFE formula, but more often provides basic information and references to the legislation that contains the formulas. It is important to use the actual legislation for formulas with numerous GTR guarantees, different schedules for urban and rural districts, "hold harmless" clauses, et cetera. 26 23. The ratios are exact for larger jurisdictions (population of 20,000 or more); small jurisdictions are assigned ratios for the parts of their counties that are not covered by the exact ratios.
The way that a state assesses property (relative to market value) should be accounted for in the school nance formula. That is, assessment practices areproperly speaking-an issue for writing the correct formula, not a property value issue. States impose common assessment practices for the purpose of calculating state aid, even when they allow localities to practice idiosyncratic assessment practices for the purpose of raising local property tax revenue. Common assessment practices are necessary because districts could otherwise get state aid simply by manipulating their assessment ratios and nominal property tax rates. Property assessed according to the state's common practice is often called the "equalized grand list." The existence of equalized grand lists does not necessarily imply that a state has SFE. The source for states' assessment practices is the "Taxable Property Values" section of the Census of Governments.
24. See United States Of ce of Education [1969, 1972, 1974, 1979] and American Education Finance Association [1988, 1992, 1995] .
25. I have investigated the effects of including indicators for how long a law has been in effect. These results are available from the author. 26. A hold harmless clause wholly or partially exempts districts from participating in an SFE scheme if it would have a signi cant negative impact on their per-pupil revenues. In some states, the districts that are most "property rich" do not participate in SFE.
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For each formula, I obtained the foundation tax rate, the school-related income (or sales) tax rate, the tax price, and the at grant for each district. Foundation tax rates are the easiest to obtain because they are often stated in the legislation and one need only apply hold harmless clauses to see which districts are exempted. Foundation/ at grants are either stated explicitly in the legislation or can be calculated by applying the self-funding formula to districts that are not exempted from the foundation tax rate. The tax price is calculated by differentiating the district's budget constraint. The school-related income tax rate is set to zero if the formula is self-funding. Otherwise, one calculates the difference between the expenditures for which the formula provides and the property tax revenues for which the formula provides. This difference is divided by the state's income tax base and an implied income tax rate is generated. Although the same procedures are followed for calculating each state's school nance variables, the complexity of the actual calculations varies greatly. A self-funding FA scheme with no hold harmless clause requires a few lines of code; a GTR formula with multiple guarantees may require several pages. Table I shows SFEs that occurred from 1970 to 1990. The rst column is borrowed from Downes and Shah [1994] , Manwaring and Sheffrin [1997] , and Evans, Murray, and Schwab [1999] . These studies organize states by whether they had a court-ordered, legislative, or no SFE. The date of the equalization follows each state's name.
VI. FACTS ABOUT SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATIONS
The remaining columns show actual values of the inverted tax price (the minimum and maximum in a state) and the foundation tax rate (the median in a state). Table I does not adequately describe equalization schemes: one needs to know how tax prices and tax rates are distributed within each state. One also needs to know about foundation grants and school-related income taxes. Nevertheless, Table I demonstrates some key points. First, the categorization into court-ordered, legislative, and "no equalization" does not accurately re ect the incentives imposed. Within the "court-ordered" category, for instance, there are equalizations that discourage spending (California and Utah), equalizations that encourage spending (New Jersey), equaliza-1210 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS because there is substantial variation in how tax prices and foundation tax rates are distributed within states. Also, income/sales tax rates and at grants are not shown, and the variables shown incorporate the endogenous responses of school districts. The "before" year is the closest year before the equalization for which data are available (1970 or 1980) . The "after" year is the closest year after the equalization for which data are available (1980 or 1990) . ** These states had legislative school nance equalizations prior to their court-ordered equalizations. *** Every district uses the mandatory minimum rate. ‡ State makes substantial use of income or sales taxes for funding equalization.
States are categorized based on Downes and Shah [1994] , Manwaring and Sheffrin [1997] , and Evans, Murray, and Schwab [1999] . The source is author's calculations based on states' school nance laws; , 1982 , and 1992 , and 1990 Censuses of Population and Housing.
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the "no equalization" category have equalization activity. The "no equalization" category contains some of the strongest pro-spending equalizations (New York, Pennsylvania), an equalization that could be strongly anti-or pro-spending depending on how the tax prices are distributed (Michigan), and some stringent FA schemes (Montana, Indiana). The activity in the "no equalization" category suggests that judicial or political drama can make an SFE known, even if it is more modest than other states' "routine" changes to their school nance laws. Finally, Table I shows that some court-ordered and legislative "equalizations" change parameters in a direction that is apparently anti-equalization.
In short, Table I should make one doubt whether a dummy variable for equalization will do a reasonably good job of representing the economic content of school nance schemes. One should also doubt the usefulness of an empirical strategy with two dummy variables, one for court-ordered equalization and one for legislative equalization.
VII. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
As discussed above, a school nance formula affects the values of four variables: the foundation tax rate, the schoolrelated income (or sales) tax rate, the marginal tax price, and the at grant. My basic speci cation has these four variables and demographic characteristics as the independent variables. I include demographic characteristics that may affect or re ect a district's demand for school spending: mean household income, income inequality (the Gini Coef cient), the poverty rate, the shares of adults who are high school-educated and college-educated, the shares of the population who are schoolaged and retirement-aged, the shares of the population who are black, Hispanic, and urban. I include year effects to control for factors that in uence per-pupil spending across all school districts in a given year. Such factors include federal aid and the growth rate of the national economy. I also include districtspeci c xed effects, which help to control for unobserved variables that are relatively xed over time within a districtfor instance, school organization and idiosyncratic factors that affect the local cost of schooling. Of course, the district xed effects subsume state xed effects.
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The basic estimating equation for spending is (13) log~e jst ! 5 a 1 t jst f 1 a 2 t jst 1 a 3 ITP jst 1 a 4 log S 1 1 f jst y jst D 1 a 5 log~y jst ! 1 X jst a 6 1 YR t a y 1 D js a 8 1 e st 1 e jst , where j indexes districts, s indexes states, and t indexes years. Several variables have already been de ned: spending (e), the foundation tax rate (t f ), mean household income ( y), and the vector of district-speci c demographic characteristics (X). t j s t is the income/sales tax rate that supports school nance, ITP js t is the inverted tax price, YR t is a vector of year indicator variables, and D j s is a vector of district indicator variables. If households spend grant income just as they spend normal income, then one would simply add the at grant to y js t . The ypaper literature suggests that households do not treat grant income and normal income similarly, so I separate the at grant from regular income:
(14) log~y jst 1 f jst ! 5 log F y jstS 11 f jst y jst D G 5 log~y jst ! 1 log S 11 f jst y jst D , and I allow separate coef cients on the at grant and regular income variables. If households spend identically out of at grants and regular income, a 4 will be equal to a 5 . e s t is a stateyear random effect, and e j s t is a district-state-year random effect.
Since some school nance formulas make the foundation tax rate and inverted tax price vary only at the state-year level, it is necessary to have a state-year random effect in order to calculate the correct standard errors [Moulton 1986 ]. I initially estimate equation (13) by least squares, but this is not strictly correct because the actual parameters we observe in a district re ect its response to SFE. I use an instrumental variables method, sometimes called "simulated instruments" to remedy the endogeneity problem. I instrument for a district's actual school nance variables with the values the variables would take on if the district retained its 1970 characteristics (except for in ation). For instance, I use the shelter price index to adjust 1970 property values, and I use the personal income series to adjust 1970 incomes. 27 The simulated instruments include the variation in school 27. Both series are created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are on its webpage (www.bls.gov).
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS nance variables generated by laws, but exclude the variation generated by endogenous district responses to the laws. Thus, simulated instrumental variables identify the effect of changing the laws. The least squares results exaggerate the true effects of laws (in absolute value, they are overestimates) because the school nance variables would vary more if districts did not respond to them. Intuitively, districts' endogenous responses soften the treatment that the state intends for them. For instance, suppose that a scheme assigns a very high tax price to a district. The district is likely to choose a lower local tax rate, and property values are likely to fall in the district. Both reactions will make the district's observed tax price more modest than the tax price initially assigned to it.
Endogeneity will likely make the least squares estimates exaggerated, but it is hard to say whether the least squares estimates will be exaggerated or attenuated overall because instrumenting may reduce attenuation bias caused by measurement error. Imperfect matching of the Census of Population to districts is the primary source of measurement error in the school nance variables. The simulated instruments t the potentially endogenous school variables extremely well. In each of the rststage regressions, the p-value is less than 0.0000 for the F-test that the simulated instruments are jointly equal to zero. 28 There are a few other estimation issues. It is dif cult to say whether the equation should be estimated with weights based on the number of students in each district. If all districts follow the same behavioral model, then each district's observation should be weighted equally for estimating the effects of equalization schemes. If districts follow a variety of models, however, then one would like the estimated effects to re ect the behavior of districts in proportion to the number of children controlled by those districts. I show both unweighted and weighted estimates.
Also, it is unclear whether it is desirable to include district demographic variables as independent variables. On the one hand, these variables help control for exogenous changes in a district's circumstances that affect its conduct. Such changes 28. This is not surprising since, for instance, all districts in a state with a self-funding FA scheme have tax prices equal to one and a school-related income/ sales tax equal to zero. Districts' responses cannot affect these values, so the simulated instruments and the potentially endogenous variables are identical. Similarly, in a GTR scheme with three guarantees, only a small share of districts will react so much that they change the guarantee that applies to them.
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would not be picked up by year effects or district xed effects. On the other hand, some of the changes in a district's demographic variables could be endogenous to the school nance program in effect. Rather than attempt to decide whether including the demographic variables is mainly good or bad, I show estimates with and without the demographic variables.
Finally, California's equalization has in uenced researchers because the state's population is large and because the equalization is extreme. But, California also has trends (like immigration) that are potentially confounding. Also, if Proposition 13 was not a consequence of equalization, then its effects are also confounding. I show estimates with and without observations from California. Table II shows the results of estimating equation (13). The least squares and instrumental variables estimates turn out to be very similar, and I focus on the instrumental variables results.
VIII. SPENDING RESULTS
The coef cients on the demographic variables are much as one would expect. The elasticity of per-pupil spending with respect to mean household income is 0.292 (0.072). Per-pupil spending is increasing in the Gini coef cient and the share of the population who are Hispanic. It is decreasing in the share of the population who are school-aged. The remaining demographic variables do not have coef cients that are statistically different from zero at conventional levels of signi cance. This is probably because of the district xed effects, which absorb much of the effect of demographic variables that vary little over time.
The effect of the foundation tax rate is 2 2.121 (0.851). The introduction of a stringent FA scheme might increase the foundation tax rate by 30 mils, or 0.030. The coef cient indicates that a 30 mil increase would generate a 6.4 percent fall in per-pupil spending.
The coef cient on the inverted tax price is 0.161 (0.068). This suggests that states like California and New Mexico, which reduced districts' inverted tax prices from 1 to 0 (or nearly zero), generated 16 percent reductions in per-pupil spending. Conversely, districts whose inverted tax prices rose from 1 to 1.5 (such districts exist in New Jersey, Connecticut, Kansas, Georgia, Michigan, and New York) should have experienced 8 percent increases in per-pupil spending. Note that all districts in California and New Mexico experienced inverted tax prices close to zero, 1216 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS In the instrumental variables regressions, the variables with asterisks are instrumented with the values the variables would take on if the districts maintained their pre-SFE conduct. Standard errors that allow for state-year clustering are in parentheses. All nancial variables are in 1999 dollars. The pupil-weighted means and standard deviations of the dependent variable are 8. 204 and 0.295 (1971-1972), 8.297 and 0.293 (1981-1982), and 8.721 and 0.290 (1991-1992) . The R 2 of the least squares regression is 0.616. The source is author's calculations based on states' school nance laws; , 1982 , and 1992 , and 1990 Censuses of Population.
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but that only some districts in states like New Jersey experienced inverted tax prices greater than or equal to 1.5. Inverted tax prices that are greater than 1 are subsidized, and the expense of offering the subsidies makes states offer them to only some districts.
The coef cient on the at grant variable is 0.537 (0.264), which indicates that districts spend much more out of at grant income than out of a similar change in mean household income. A 10 percent increase in income that comes from a at grant induces a 5.3 percent increase in per-pupil spending. Recall, in contrast, that a 10 percent increase in income from regular sources induces only a 2.9 percent increase in per-pupil spending.
Income/sales tax revenues are what supports some of the observed at grants and subsidized tax prices, yet the coef cient on the income or sales tax rate is not statistically different from zero. (The point estimate is positive.) This suggests that income/ sales taxes that support grants and subsidized tax prices have little or no depressing effect on per-pupil spending. Of course, higher tax rates on income and sales must lower households' consumption of something, but the direct effect on per-pupil spending is evidently weak. Presumably, income/sales taxes depress consumption across the board, so that the small income/ sales tax rate that supports equalization has no indiscernible effect on per-pupil spending. This is in contrast to the foundation tax rate, which has a statistically signi cant negative effect on per-pupil spending.
Overall, there are two important ndings in the table. One is the magnitude of the effect of the inverted tax price: changing the inverted tax price that a district faces can generate dramatic changes in its spending. The second important nding is that at grant categorical aid apparently has almost no potential to generate leveling-down. 29 The estimated effects of the school nance parameters are quite robust to changes in the speci cation. Weighting the equation by districts' student populations reduces the effect of the foundation tax rate (2 1.781 with a standard error of 0.891) and the inverted tax price (0.145 with a standard error of 0.068), but does not change the overall picture. Excluding time-varying de-29. It is not possible to draw a similarly strong conclusion about matching grant categorical aid because, although it uses income/sales taxes, it also affects tax prices (like GTR schemes). The table shows predictions that are based on the estimates shown in the "Instrumental variables" column of Table II. See Table II for details on the estimates. The rst, third, and fth columns show statistics on actual per-pupil spending in 1990 (1999$). The second, fourth, and sixth columns show how the per-pupil spending statistics would change if there were no SFE scheme in effect. To generate the numbers shown in these columns, I used the coef cients and variables from Table II and generated the per-pupil spending statistics using the foundation tax rates, equalization-related income/sales tax rates inverted tax prices, and at grants that were actually in effect in 1990. I compare these statistics with no-SFE statistics generated by setting the foundation tax rate to zero, the equalization-related income/sales tax rate to zero, the inverted tax price to one, and the at grant to zero. mographic variables or California districts changes the coefcients only slightly.
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In Table III, I show how the coef cients estimated in Table II  clarify actual equalization experiences. The two left-hand columns of Table III present, for each state, (1) actual mean perpupil spending in 1990 (1999 dollars), (2) an estimate of the change in mean per-pupil spending due to the state's equalization scheme. In order to generate the predictions for the second column, I calculated what mean per-pupil spending would have been if no equalization scheme were in effect (that is, I set the foundation tax rate to zero, the equalization-related income/sales tax rate to zero, the inverted tax price to one, and the at grant to zero). For instance, consider the entry for New Hampshire, which had a moderate FA program in 1990. Its mean per-pupil spending was $6654, and this mean spending was 2.9 percent lower than it would have been if there had been no equalization program. In other words, New Hampshire had mild leveling-down.
The second column of Table III shows that equalization schemes have generated both leveling-up and leveling-down. Noteworthy leveling-down states are Arizona (10.1 percent lower), California (15.0 percent lower), New Mexico (13.3 percent lower), Oklahoma (9.6 percent lower), and Utah (10.4 percent lower). Noteworthy leveling-up states are New Jersey (7.2 percent higher), New York (6.8 percent higher), and Pennsylvania (7.7 percent higher).
The remaining columns of Table III show how equalization schemes have affected measures of spending inequality. In the third column I show the pupil-weighted coef cient of variation in per-pupil spending for each state in 1990. The next column contains an estimate of the change in the coef cient of variation due to the state's equalization scheme. Consider the entry for New Hampshire. Its coef cient of variation is 0.196, and this coefcient of variation was 0.056 lower than it would have been if there had been no equalization program. In other words, the standard deviation of New Hampshire's per-pupil spending would have been 5.6 percent more of its mean per-pupil spending if there had been no equalization program.
In the fth column I show the log 90-10 ratio (the log of the ratio of per-pupil spending at the pupil-weighted ninetieth percentile and per-pupil spending at the pupil-weighted tenth percentile). The far right-hand column contains an estimate of the change in the log 90-10 ratio. For instance, New Hampshire's log 1220 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 90-10 ratio is 0.466, which implies that the pupil who experiences spending at the ninetieth percentile enjoys per-pupil spending that is about 46.6 percent higher than the pupil who experiences spending at the tenth percentile. New Hampshire's log 90-10 ratio would be 0.127 higher if it had no equalization program. That is, the students at the ninetieth and tenth percentiles would experience spending that differed by about 59.3 percent if there had been no equalization scheme.
New Hampshire had a moderate FA scheme in 1990, and its experience is reasonably representative of states with moderate schemes. Per-pupil spending is partially equalized, particularly because the foundation grant brings up per-pupil spending among otherwise low-spending districts. New Hampshire's equalizing-relatively mild overall, substantial for otherwise lowspending districts-is not achieved without downward pressure on mean per-pupil spending.
The majority of states have equalization experiences as moderate as that of New Hampshire. Their mean per-pupil spending changes by zero to 3 percent (positive or negative); their coefcients of variation fall by zero to 0.05; and their log 90-10 ratios fall by zero to 0.15. Although the most common equalization experience in the United States is a moderate one, it is not necessarily an optimal one. Among states that experience similar equalizing, there is still variation in whether the state is leveling down or leveling up. If one takes the rhetoric of school nance legislation seriously, then much of the leveling-down that occurs is unintentional.
Notice that the states with the most dramatic equalizing are all leveling-down states: California, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah. In these states, the difference between spending at the ninetieth and tenth percentiles would be almost 20 percent greater if no equalization program were in effect. 30 Less dramatic equalizing occurs in the states with the greatest increases in mean per-pupil spending (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania). In these states, the difference between spending at the ninetieth and tenth percentiles would be only about 10 percent greater if no equalization program were in effect.
In short, Table III suggests that-in practice-some equaliz-30. In California the observed log 90-10 ratio is nonzero largely because of nonregular spending on special education spending, bilingual education spending, et cetera.
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ing but not dramatic equalizing is compatible with leveling-up. This is a statement about the schemes that states have actually enacted-not a statement about what states could accomplish in theory. The reason that leveling-up schemes tend to attempt more modest equalizing than leveling-down schemes is probably that states face little or no direct cost when they set inverted tax prices close to zero but face substantial costs when they set inverted tax prices far above 1. It is expensive to bribe districts that would prefer low spending into spending a lot. It is inexpensive to forbid high spending.
Usually, courts and legislatures are mandated to achieve a combination of equity and adequacy in school nance. Do the states that achieve dramatic equalizing through leveling-down go too far? A minimal standard for whether a scheme is achieving a good mix of equity and adequacy is the criterion: "Do no harm to poor districts." That is, if in pursuit of equity goals, a scheme makes mean spending fall so much that spending is less adequate in poor districts, it has almost certainly gone too far. In order to determine whether any states' equalization schemes actually make spending fall in poor districts, I calculated the number of poor districts that would be predicted to have higher per-pupil spending under pure local nance. I considered two de nitions of poor districts: those in which mean household income is at or below the state's twentieth percentile and those in which perpupil property value is at or below the state's twentieth percentile. Regardless of which de nition I use, California and New Mexico (and only these two states) have a majority of their poor districts being worse off under equalization. These are also the two states that allow districts to keep only a negligible portion of the revenues they raise to support local schools. 31 31. De ne districts as "poor" if they had mean household income at or below the twentieth percentile for their state in 1970 state in . Then, between 1970 state in and 1990 per-pupil spending grew by only 3.5 percent in poor California districts and by only 3.9 percent in poor New Mexico districts. The poor California districts experienced the lowest growth rate among poor districts in the United States, except for poor districts in Utah, which experienced a 3.3 percent growth rate.
(Recall that Utah also had a strong leveling down SFE.) Only two other states' poor districts had growth rates similar to that of poor districts in New Mexico and California: Louisiana and Iowa. California and New Mexico stand out, however, because between 1970 and 1990 the growth rate of income per student was 6 percent in California and 5 percent in New Mexico, but only 3 percent in Utah, 4 percent in Louisiana, and 4 percent in Iowa. Put another way, in a regression of poor districts' spending growth on their states' per-student income growth, an indicator for California and New Mexico has a highly statistically signi cant coef cient of 2 1.8.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS IX. OTHER EFFECTS OF SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATION SFE can affect outcomes other than school spending. Some of these outcomes (property values, private school attendance) can feed back into the determination of school spending.
The Effects of School Finance Equalization on Property Values
SFE schemes can change property values, both because SFE schemes tax school productivity that has been capitalized in house prices and because SFE schemes themselves can be capitalized. In the left-hand panel of Table IV , I investigate how property values are affected by estimating a version of equation (13) in which the dependent variable is the log of property value per pupil in a district. 32 The coef cient on the foundation tax rate is 2 2.666 (0.632) in the left-hand column, which shows unweighted IV estimates. Recall that introducing a stringent FA program might raise the foundation tax rate by 30 mils (0.030). Therefore, the coef cient indicates that a stringent FA program might lower property value per pupil by about 7.9 percent.
Neither the equalization-related income/sales tax rate nor the at grant has a statistically signi cant effect on property values. The coef cient on the inverted tax price is statistically signi cant, however, and ranges from 0.159 (0.058) to 0.178 (0.054), depending on the speci cation. These estimates suggest that the most extreme GTR schemes (those that lower the inverted tax price from one to zero) reduce property values by 16 to 18 percent. Of course, these changes in property values will not necessarily be distributed equally across districts. In most schemes that vary the inverted tax price, "property-rich" districts face lower inverted tax prices than "property-poor" districts.
To the extent that policy-makers have considered any reactions to equalization schemes, they have considered only how districts might change their property tax rates. The results shown suggest that policy-makers also need to consider how the property tax base reacts.
32. I show just the unweighted and weighted IV estimates, but the results are similar for the speci cation with few covariates and the speci cation that excludes California (available from the author). In these instrumental variables regressions, the variables with asterisks are instrumented with the values the variables would take on if the districts maintained their pre-SFE conduct. Standard errors that allow for state-year grouped effects are shown in parentheses. All nancial variables are in 1999 dollars. The pupil-weighted means and standard deviations of log per-pupil property value are 12. 009 and 0.547 (1970), 12.806 and 0.772 (1980), and 12.737 and 0.707 (1990) . Per-pupil property value is constructed as described in the text using states' administrative data, the Taxable Property Values section of the Census of Government, and the Census of Population. The pupil-weighted means and standard deviations of the share of students in private schools are 10. 819 and 8.677 (1970), 12.616 and 7.522 (1980), and 12.853 and 7.329 (1990) . The share of students in private schools derives from Census of Population data. It is the ratio of the number of 3-to 19-year-olds enrolled in private schools to the number enrolled in all (public and private) elementary and secondary schools. The overall source is author's calculations based on states' school nance laws; the 1972, 1982, and 1992 Censuses of Governments; and the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses of Population.
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The right-hand panel of Table IV shows estimates of the effect of equalization on private school attendance. 33 The equation estimated is the same as equation (13), except for the fact that the dependent variable is the share of students who attend private school. Over the period from 1970 to 1990, the mean private school share in America was about 0.11, so that an increase of 0.03 (3 percentage points)-say-would represent a substantial increase in private schooling.
The coef cient on the foundation tax rate varies between 0.301 and 0.361, depending on the speci cation. A stringent FA program might raise the foundation tax rate by 30 mils, so the coef cient estimates suggest that a stringent FA program might increase the share of students who attend private school by about 0.01 (1 percentage point).
Neither the equalization-related income/sales tax rate nor the at grant has a statistically signi cant effect on property values. The coef cient on the inverted tax price is statistically signi cant, however, and ranges from 2 0.026 (0.005) to 2 0.032 (0.005). These estimates suggest that the most extreme levelingdown schemes (those that lower the inverted tax price from one to zero) increase the share of students who attend private school by about 0.03 (3 percentage points). The same estimates suggest that the private school share falls by about 1.5 percentage points in districts that experience the inverted tax prices of 1.5. Of course, only a minority of districts have inverted tax prices of 1.5 or more, even under the most extreme leveling-up schemes. In general, the private school share will rise in "property-rich" districts and fall in "property-poor" ones.
Recall that the private school share matters, in part, because the departure of high demand parents from the public sector can lower spending targets built into school nance formulas-either because the targets are affected by statewide politics or because the targets are a function of spending in high demand districts. 33 . I show just the unweighted and weighted IV estimates, but similar results for the speci cation with few covariates and the speci cation that excludes California are available from the author.
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Table V focuses on the only measure of student performance that is available for every school district in the United States over the 1970 -1990 period: the high school drop-out rate. This measure has several advantages. It is measured consistently (in the Censuses of Population), it re ects the entire population of students (unlike average scores on college admissions tests, which are strongly affected by sample selection), and it re ects the achievement of students who disproportionately live in districts that are the intended bene ciaries of equalization. Of course, it would be optimal to use scores from a test that was universally or randomly administered, but such a test does not exist. Even the National Assessment of Educational Progress is not available at the state level before 1990.
There are two ways to show the effect of equalization schemes on the drop-out rate. One can estimate equation (13) with the drop-out rate as the dependent variable. Alternatively, one can treat simulated equalization parameters as instruments for school spending. The latter procedure is based on the idea that equalizations are spending shocks to districts that can be used to estimate "education production functions." Such estimates are likely to suffer from relatively little simultaneity bias because SFE shocks spending while the district's underlying characteristics are held constant by the district xed effects and district-level demographic variables.
The two left-hand columns of Table V show the results of the rst procedure. The drop-out rate is not statistically signi cantly affected by the foundation tax rate, the school-related income/ sales tax rate, or the inverted tax price. The at grant variable does, however, have a statistically signi cant effect. This suggests that dropping-out is affected only in districts that would otherwise be very low-spending-that is, in districts constrained to raise spending by the imposition of the at grant. A at grant that is 10 percent of mean income, say, is estimated to reduce the drop-out rate by 0.0076 to 0.0101 (0.76 to 1.01 percentage points).
The two right-hand columns of Table V present the results obtained if one instruments for per-pupil spending with the simulated parameters that describe equalization schemes. The coefcient on per-pupil spending is not statistically signi cantly different from zero in either of the speci cations that are shown. It 1226 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS In these instrumental variables regressions, the variables with asterisks are instrumented with the values the variables would take on if the districts maintained their pre-SFE conduct. Log per-pupil spending is also instrumented with the simulated SFE parameters. Standard errors that allow for state-year grouped effects are shown in parentheses. All nancial variables are in 1999 dollars. The pupil-weighted means and standard deviations of the dependent variable are 0.152 and 0.078 (1970), 0.137 and 0.068 (1980), and 0.115 and 0.057 (1990) . The share of students who drop out derives from Census of Population data. It is the number of 16-to 19-year-olds who are neither enrolled in school nor are high school graduates divided by the total number of 16to 19-year-olds. The overall source is author's calculations based on states' school nance laws; , 1982 , and 1992 , and 1990 Censuses of Population.
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is also not statistically signi cant in alternative speci cations that I estimated to check robustness.
The mixed results should make one wary about drawing rm conclusions about the effect of equalization on the drop-out rate, but they hint that equalization improves student achievement the most (perhaps only) in schools that would have very low spending if left to their own devices.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper I explain how school nance equalization works and why equalization schemes have such varying effects on school spending. I demonstrate that schemes can level spending up or down, depending on the price and income effects they impose. Schemes can be characterized by a few variables, and-by choosing the values of these variables-a state should be able to implement the scheme that best meets its objectives.
While equalization schemes can level up or down, nearequality of per-pupil spending is achieved only under schemes that level down. This is because a state faces no direct cost of equalizing through leveling down-it only need set prohibitively high tax prices for districts that would prefer to spend a lot. The direct costs of leveling up are considerable: a state must bribe some districts to spend a lot more than they would prefer to.
FA schemes, which leave the tax price of local school spending untouched, tend to cause moderate leveling-down. A middleof-the-road FA scheme like that of New Hampshire causes mean per-pupil spending to fall by about 2.9 percent, and a stringent FA scheme like that of Arizona causes mean spending to fall by 10.1 percent. Such reductions in per-pupil spending are an average of spending decreases in "rich" districts and increases in "poor" districts. GTR schemes, which affect the tax price of local school spending, can cause substantial leveling-down (15 percent) or more modest leveling-up (7 percent).
Strikingly, it appears that some students from poor households would actually have better funded schools if their states did not attempt such complete equalization. These students live in California and New Mexico, where districts face nearly in nite tax prices. More generally, because equalization schemes can contain feedback by which they depress their own spending targets, poor students can be worse off under equalization schemes 1228 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS that are apparently more generous than the categorical aid schemes they replaced.
I show that house prices fall in districts that are penalized for having high property value per pupil. The converse is also true. Such capitalization partially undoes the effect of a school nance equalization scheme. I show that parents are induced to send their children to private schools in districts that are penalized for having high property value per pupil. While the estimated effects of equalization on student achievement are generally weak, it does appear that the drop-out rate falls in districts that are constrained to raise spending by the imposition of a per-pupil spending oor.
If these were my only results, I would simply conclude that states should choose their equalization schemes carefully, in order to move toward their equality and adequacy goals.
The paper has, however, more general economic content. First, school districts respond like economic agents to the incentives created by equalization schemes. Their conduct is not perplexing if one understands the constraints and prices they are facing. Second, school nance equalization schemes have unintended consequences because they base redistribution among jurisdictions on assets (property) whose prices depend on how households value the jurisdictions. One unintended consequence is that school nance equalization does not merely redistribute from people with greater to people with lower ability-to-pay; it redistributes from schools that are more productive to schools that are less productive. It can also redistribute from people with greater taste for education to people with lower taste for education, undo its own formula over time, and generate feedback that ampli es its intended effect. Categorical aid, which is an alternative method of redistributing among schools, does not produce similar unintended consequences. HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
